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FAIR REPRESENTATION ON JURIES IN THE EASTERN
DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN: ANALYZING PAST EFFORTS
AND RECOMMENDING FUTURE ACTION
AndrewJ. Lievense*
This Note builds on past recommendations to reform jury selection systems to make
juries more representative of the community. Juries representing a fair cross section
of the community are both a statutory and constitutional requirement, as well as a
policy goal. How a judicial district designs and implements its jury selection sys-
tem is important to meeting this requirement.
Part I of this Note analyzes the history and development of the representativeness
interest on juries, explains how the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan attempted to meet this interest in the 1980s and 1990s, and
reports and addresses the current demographic information of jurors at two stages
of the Eastern District's selection system. Part H comments on prior proposals for
reform of the jury selection system, and makes three proposals for reform: (1) im-
proving the source lists from which jurors are drawn; (2) improving the jury
questionnaire; and (3) if still necessary, increasing the representation levels of un-
derrepresented groups on petit juries Iry decreasing their representation on grand
juries. Part I analyzes potential constitutional and practical objections to the
grand jury/petit jury reform.
The jury is at the foundation of our jurisprudential system, and
no place in the system is the jury more important than when a per-
son faces the possibility of imprisonment. To be effective, however,
the jury system must not only be impartial, it must also reflect a fair
cross section of the community. Most people are familiar with the
jury selection process, known as voir dire, which occurs right before
trial, as attorneys select jurors from the jury venire. But citizens who
are underrepresented in the venire itself are at a disadvantage be-
fore the attorneys even begin the selection process. Few people,
even few lawyers and litigants, understand how jury venires are cre-
ated in the first place. This may be because the process of creating a
jury venire is an unfamiliar, administrative process handled by the
courts-not the litigants or their lawyers.
Juries representing a fair cross section of the community meet the
constitutional goal of the Sixth Amendment,1 as well as the policy
* BA, Ohio Wesleyan University, 1999; J.D., University of Michigan Law School, 2005.
The author would like to thank Professor Phoebe C. Ellsworth for her assistance, guidance and
feedback regarding this Note, and his friends and family for their editing skills toward this
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1. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. (stating that defendants enjoy the right to trial by an "im-
partial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed"); Duren v.
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goal of engendering confidence in the criminal justice system, by
providing at least the appearance of impartiality.3 When a jury sys-
tem fails to meet these goals on a consistent basis or to a
considerable degree, the Sixth Amendment or Equal Protection
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments may be violated.
But, if the disparity between the actual demographic group's popu-
lation and the jury pool demographic group's population does not
rise to the level of constitutional concern, the government need
not correct the problem, allowing smaller disparities between the
actual demographic group population and jury pool demographic
group population to persist.
In the 1980s and 1990s, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan (Eastern District) attempted to do
more than was constitutionally required to achieve a fair cross sec-
tion of the community on its juries. The Eastern District
implemented a "balancing" system that removed individuals from
certain groups, particularly overrepresented Whites, permitting
increased representation for previously underrepresented groups.
Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals struck down this sys-
tem.4
But ever since the Sixth Circuit struck down the Eastern Dis-
trict's attempt to remedy structural problems in the juror
recruitment system that resulted in disproportionate, under-
involvement of minorities, particularly African Americans,5 the
Eastern District has been content with the discrepancies that result
in their current, less ambitious, but "race-neutral," jury selection
plan, which does not ensure a fair cross section of the community
in jury pools. 6 The Eastern District's jury selection plan developed
in the 1990s and struck down in United States v. Ovalle sought to cor-
rect significant, though likely not constitutionally prohibited,
differences between the racial composition of the general popula-
tion and jury venires empanelled in the Eastern District.
Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979) (striking down a law making it more difficult for women to serve
on juries as violating the Sixth Amendment guarantee of an impartial jury); Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (striking down a law preventing African Americans from serving
on juries as a denial of the Fourteenth Amendment).
2. See Leslie Ellis & Shari Seidman Diamond, Race, Diversity, and Jury Composition: Bat-
tering and Bolstering Legitimacy, 78 CHI.-KENT L. Rv. 1033 (2003).
3. SeeVALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMARJUDGING THEJURY 47-61 (1986).
4. United States v. Ovalle, 136 F.3d 1092 (6th Cir. 1998).
5. See id. at 1095.
6. EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, JS-12 FORM
(Oct. 1, 2000-Sept. 30, 2002) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Re-
form) [hereinafterJS-12]. TheJS-12 is a U.S. Department ofJustice form used by courts to
monitor demographic data regarding their juror selection system. See infra Part I.C.
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While the Eastern District's "balancing" plan did not pass consti-
tutional muster, there are other ways to accomplish the goal of
having juries more adequately mirror the community from which
they are constituted. Part I discusses the development of the repre-
sentativeness interest on juries required by the Constitution, federal
statutes, and the judiciary, with particular focus on how the Eastern
District has attempted to achieve that interest. Part II argues for the
adoption of reforms addressing each phase of the jury recruitment
process and also discusses previously suggested reforms. The most
controversial reform, that representation of underrepresented
communities on grand juries be temporarily and slightly sacrificed
in favor of increased representation of those communities on petit
juries, will receive particular attention. Finally, Part III addresses po-
tential criticisms of the grand jury/petit jury reform, including
potential constitutional issues. Though the same ideas and princi-
ples apply in most states, this Note will focus on the federal trial
courts, with special attention given to the Eastern District.
Though each judicial jurisdiction may have different terminol-
ogy to describe slightly varying jury selection procedures, this Note
adopts those of the Eastern District. Accordingly, "jury pool" is in-
tended to describe all adults over eighteen years of age who
generally qualify for jury service. This list typically comes from
voter registration and other state databases. The "master jury
wheel," a subset of the jury pool, is drawn randomly from the jury
pool for the purposes of mailing ajury questionnaire to determine
specific qualification for jury service. The "qualified juror wheel" is
a subset of the master jury wheel and is composed of all statutorily
qualified jurors who return the jury questionnaire indicating the
capacity and qualification to serve on ajury. "Venires," panels from
which jurors are selected by the court and litigants, are drawn from
the qualified juror wheel.
1. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF RACE AND JURY SERVICE,
AND THE EASTERN DISTRICT EXPERIENCE
A. General Constitutional and Statutory Background
The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to trial "by an im-
partial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
SUMMER 2005] 943
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been committed."7 The Jury Selection and Service Act provides
that "[n] o citizen shall be excluded from service as a grand or petit
juror in the district courts of the United States ... on account of
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or economic status."' As
the Sixth Circuit has observed: "The plain meaning of this section
is a clear prohibition of discrimination in the selection of grand
and petit juries."9 In passing the Jury Selection and Service Act, the
House of Representatives noted that juries should "reflect the
community's sense of justice in deciding [the case]. As long as
there are significant departures from the cross sectional goal, bi-
ased juries are the result-biased in the sense that they reflect a
slanted view of the community they are supposed to represent."'
The right to a trial by jury for all serious crimes is founded in the
jury's historical role in society. The Supreme Court has noted that
juries serve as a "protection against arbitrary rule,"" observing that
"the truth of every accusation, whether proferred in the shape of
indictment, information, or appeal, should afterwards be con-
firmed by the unanimous suffrage of twelve of his equals and
neighbours, indifferently chosen and superior to all suspicion.'
2
For developing jury selection systems, the Court has interpreted
the Constitution as requiring "a body truly representative of the
community."13 One important benefit of such a system is that im-
partial juries, representing a fair cross section of the community,
engender confidence in the judicial system. 14 It is possible that di-
verse juries better understand or interpret the facts or law of a
case. 5 Although the Supreme Court has repeatedly "recognized
the importance of both the fact and the appearance of impartiality,
7. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
8. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1877 (2000).
9. Ovalle, 136 F.3d at 1099; see also Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 505 (1972) (interpret-
ing a similarly worded statute as having such meaning).
10. H.R. Rep. No. 90-1076, at 6 (1968), as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.CA.N. 1792,1797.
11. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151 (1968).
12. Id. at 151-52 (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 349) (citations omitted)).
13. Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940).
14. See Kim Forde-Mazrui, Jural Districting: Selecting Impartial Juries Through Community
Representation, 52 VAND. L. REv. 353, 361 n.30 (1999) (citing Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S.
522, 530 (1975)); see also Susanne H. Vikoren, Justice orJurymandering? Confronting the Under-
representation of Racial Groups in the Jury Pool of New York's Eastern District, 27 COLUM. HUM. RTs.
L. REV. 605 (1996).
15. For a survey of many ways to improve jury understanding and jury deliberations,
see Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical Research on Deliberating
Groups, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 622 (2001); Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Allan Reifman, Juror
Comprehension and Public Policy: Perceived Problems and Proposed Solutions, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL'Y & L. 788 (2000); Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Are Twelve Heads Better Than One, 52 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 205 (1989).
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they have struggled with mixed success in achieving those goals."'
6
Despite the aspiration, the Court has never required that each jury
proportionally reflect the community. 7 Yet the costs of unrepresen-
tative juries should not be ignored. "[U]nrepresentative juries
potentially threaten the public's faith in the legitimacy of the legal
system and its outcomes" as the system loses "differing life experi-
ences and potentially differing expectations and predispositions
that can influence the assessments of the evidence, including
judgments about witness credibility, that characterize the impartial
jury."'
'
The Supreme Court, in Strauder v. West Virginia,9 long ago ruled
that it is a denial of Equal Protection to compel "a colored man to
submit to a trial for his life by a jury drawn from a panel from
which the State has expressly excluded every man of his race, be-
cause of color alone, however well qualified in other respects."2"
Striking down a statute excluding all African Americans from jury
service as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Pro-
tection Clause was just a beginning. Almost 100 years later the
Supreme Court applied a similar principle, in conjunction with the
Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury," to systematic preclu-
sions of women from jury service in Taylor v. Louisiana.2 In Taylor,
the issue was not whether a statutory provision existed which pre-
vented a female citizen from serving on a jury in violation of her
Fourteenth Amendment right. Rather, the issue was whether a viola-
tion of the defendant's right to an impartial jury, under the Sixth
Amendment, was committed by making it more difficult for women
to be called for jury duty. Women, constituting 53% of the popula-
tion, were required to apply for jury duty rather than being
automatically summoned for jury duty, resulting in 10% of the jury
pool being women. 2' Eventually, in Duren v. Missouri,24 the Court
found that a "systematic exclusion of women that results in jury ve-
nires averaging less than fifteen percent female violates the
16. Ellis & Diamond, supra note 2, at 1033.
17. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975) (citing Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S.
404, 413 (1972); Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 284 (1947)); see also Duren v. Missouri, 439
U.S. 357, 372-73 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538).
18. Ellis & Diamond, supra note 2, at 1038.
19. 100 U.S. 303, 309 (1880).
20. Id.
21. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 153 (1968) (discussing application of the Sixth
Amendment right to an impartial jury against the states).
22. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
23. Id. at 524.
24. 439 U.S. 357, 360 (1979).
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Constitution's fair-cross-section requirement. 25 Batson v. Kentucky2 6
expanded impartial jury requirements, deciding that not only is
the government prohibited from systematically making participa-
tion injury service more difficult for certain disfavored groups, but
also deciding that the state may not peremptorily strike a member
of a represented group on ajury venire panel solely on the basis of
race.2 Batson further strengthened the argument that the constitu-
tion ensures individuals the right to a diverse, impartial jury drawn
from a fair cross section of the community. Today, juror selection
processes or peremptory challenges based on race or gender can
be challenged by any party to a lawsuit, regardless of their race or
gender, making it more likely that a demographically diverse jury
will decide the case than if only some parties could raise such a
claim. Together, these cases 8 have articulated and solidified (1) the
defendant's right and (2) the community's interest in having cases
heard by fair cross sections of the community; as well as (3) a liti-
gant's right to a petit jury selected without race or gender
discrimination.
B. The Eastern District Experiment
Against this backdrop the Eastern District judges adopted and
implemented a new jury selection plan-ultimately struck down by
the Sixth Circuit as unconstitutional-that aggressively balanced
the racial composition of its qualified jury pool to reflect the racial
demographics of the public in the district. The court's judges and
administrators decided that its juror selection system was insuffi-
cient and ineffective even though it might pass constitutional
review, and sought to increase the likelihood that juries reflected
the racial demographics of the area. The Eastern District sought
proportional representation on juries to a greater extent than was
achievable by using random selection procedures. Two government
interests were at stake: ensuring that both the defendant's and the
community's rights to juries that truly represent a fair cross section
of the community were preserved.
25. Id.
26. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
27. Id. at 84 (reaffirming the principle that a state's purposeful or deliberate denial to
African Americans on account of race of participation as jurors in the administration of
justice violates the Equal Protection Clause).
28. Batson, 476 U.S. 79; Duren, 439 U.S. 357; Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303
(1880); see alsoJ.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (extending Batson protections to chal-
lenges based on gender); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991) (modifying Batson).
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The Eastern District had wrestled with the problem of having a
significant racial disparity between the general population and jury
venire population for many years.29 While certainly not alone, ° the
Eastern District endeavored to correct this problem with a more
aggressive solution than any other federal district courts had con-
sidered. The Eastern District had previously tried various measures.
For example, the pool of citizens considered for jury service was
expanded with additional source lists, such as driver's license lists,
with the hope of including additional minority groups. Addition-
ally, the Eastern District had added names from certain zip codes
to achieve greater representativeness." However, the age of then-
existing demographic population data, population shifts, and
interstate highway and industrial construction which displaced cer-
tain minority population groups, made these methods of
increasing minority representation on juries less reliable than they
had been in the past.3 2 With these tools of increasing representative-
ness neutralized and proven inadequate, alternative mechanisms
were needed to achieve increases in minority representation in the
qualified jury wheel.
The Eastern District, therefore, decided to implement a plan
that called for "balancing" the racial composition of the jury pool
by deleting a calculated number of non-African American indi-
viduals from the qualified jury wheel, thus achieving a more
balanced and representative cross section of the community.33 The
new plan set forth the following procedure:
The qualified jury wheel shall be composed of persons who
represent a fair cross-section of the area of each place of hold-
ing court as set forth in Section III of this Plan. To this end, if
the Court determines that a cognizable group of persons is
substantially overrepresented in the qualified jury wheel, the
Chief Judge shall order the Clerk to remove randomly a spe-
cific number of names so that the population of each
29. See Robert Mossing, Changes in the Eastern District of Michigan Detroit Administrative
Unit's Jury System, 63 MICH. BJ. 33 (1984).
30. See Vikoren, supra note 14, at 611 (identifying problems faced by the Eastern Dis-
trict of New York).
31. See Mossing, supra note 29, at 33 (describing past efforts to improve the jury selec-
tion system).
32. See Avern Cohn & David R. Sherwood, The Rise and Fall of Affirmative Action injury
Selection, 32 U. MIcH.J.L. REFORM 323, 325 (1999).
33. See id.; cf United States v. Greene, 971 F. Supp. 1117, 1122-24 (E.D. Mich. 1997)
(providing an alternative, in depth, and historical explanation of the Eastern District's ex-
periments).
SUMMER 2005]
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cognizable group in the qualified wheel closely approximates
the percentage of the population of each group in the area of
each place of holding court, according to the most recent
published national census report. A quotient and a starting
number shall be used in this process.34
If responses to the federal juror questionnaire resulted in a dis-
proportionately low number of African Americans, "a sufficient
number of white peoples' names were then subtracted from the
qualified wheel to achieve a percentage ratio of Whites to African
Americans that conformed to the percentage ratio in the general
population established by the current census.
This plan accomplished its goal, increasing African American
representation on juries. Whereas without balancing only 8%36 of
jurors would have been African American, the balancing plan
raised African American representation to 19% for the Eastern Dis-
trict's Detroit unit.37  However, problems with the plan's
implementation remained. African Americans were the only cogni-
zable group for which "balancing" was performed, and Hispanics
were considered white for "balancing" purposes, thus harming an-
other potentially under-represented group. Defendants began to
challenge the system,3 " leading to questions as to the statutory and
constitutional validity of a program that subtracted qualified citi-
zens from service to achieve a qualified jury pool that more closely
mirrored the general, eligible population of the district, but for
only some racial groups. These questions resulted in the Sixth Cir-
cuit's decision in United States v. Ovalle, where the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals considered whether the "balancing" method
could continue. Ovalle involved a Hispanic defendant who chal-
lenged the Eastern District's jury selection procedure because it
only recognized African Americans, not Hispanics, as a cognizable
39group for balancing purposes.
34. Cohn & Sherwood, supra note 32, at 325 (quoting jury Selection Plan, VIII.B. (E.D.
Mich. 1998)).
35. Id. at 325-26.
36. In Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 524 (1975), women composed 53% of the eli-
gible population, no more than 10% of the jury pool, and 0% of the defendant's venire. In
Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 362-63 (1979), women composed 54% of the eligible popu-
lation, 26.7% of the pool, approximately 15% of weekly venires, and approximately 9% (5 of
53) of the defendant's venire. The Court struck down the jury selection systems in both
cases. The Supreme Court has not gone further, but it is unclear what percentage difference
might be sufficient to raise concern in the future.
37. Cohn & Sherwood, supra note 32, at 326.
38. See Greene, 971 F. Supp. at 1117 (challenging the Eastern District's juror selection
program).
39. United States v. Ovalle, 136 F.3d 1092, 1097 (6th Cir. 1998).
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During the relevant time period for the jury selected for the
Ovalle case, "at least 14 Hispanics and 863 other individuals were
removed from the jury wheel for the sole reason that they were not
African Americans. ' 4° The question, for the purposes of the defen-
dants' Equal Protection claim under the Fifth Amendment and the
Jury Selection and Service Act claim, was "whether non-African-
Americans were eliminated from the qualified jury wheel based
solely on their racial status in violation of the right to equal protec-
tion guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment., 41 After considering the
defendants' standing to raise the Equal Protection claim, the Sixth
Circuit noted that the standard for determining the validity of an
Equal Protection claim is the "degree of underrepresentation oc-
curring over a significant period of time., 42 Explaining how the
standard would apply in this case, however, the court said:
As the Sixth Circuit has previously indicated, the rationale
underlying [this requirement] "is that if a disparity is suffi-
ciently large over a significant period of time, then it is
unlikely that the disparity is due solely to chance or to acci-
dent, and in the absence of evidence to the contrary, a court
should conclude that racial or other ... factors entered into
the selection process." This rationale suggests that if there is
no doubt that racial factors were the primary reason for ex-
cluding potential jurors, there would be no need to utilize the
traditional ... approach; a court could simply look to the di-
rect evidence of exclusion based on race.43
Thus, the court suggested that some disparity among a particu-
lar demographic group may constitute an Equal Protection
violation by itself, without analyzing other traditional factors.
The Sixth Circuit found that "[t] he implementation of the jury
selection is clearly not race neutral" and "[an]y non-African-
American had a chance of being eliminated from the jury wheel
solely based on race. " 44 The more important and extensive analysis
addressed whether the government interests justifying the race-
conscious jury selection process were compelling and whether the
Eastern District's plan was narrowly tailored to address these
40. Id. at 1100.
41. Id. In state prosecutions, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment would be at issue.
42. Id. at 1104.
43. Id. at 1104-05 (internal citations omitted).
44. Id. at 1105.
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interests. 4' The Sixth Circuit, after discussing the historical role of
the jury, found that the "requirements of the Sixth Amendment and
the importance of both the reality and the appearance of fairness in
our criminal justice system, creating a jury pool that represents a
fair cross section of the community is a compelling government
interest."4
The Ovalle court then turned their attention to the "narrowly tai-
lored" prong of Equal Protection analysis. The court found that
the plan was not narrowly tailored and that the compelling interest
could be achieved in other ways. The Ovalle court decided this de-
spite the aforementioned evidence of considerable prior efforts to
achieve more representative jury pools through other means. 47 The
Ovalle court noted that one in five non-African American jurors
were eliminated, and thus not everyone had the same opportunity
to serve on a jury. 48 Additionally, no attempt was made to increase
jury representation of Hispanics or other cognizable groups.49 In
stead, the Ovalle court admonished the Eastern District for not
broadening membership in the jury pool as an alternative, and
non-discriminatory, means of accomplishing its goal.5° Finding a
Fifth Amendment violation, the court reversed the convictions and
struck down the policy.5'
The aftermath of this decision presented a daunting task for the
Eastern District's judges and administrators. 2 A new jury selection
plan had to be developed and implemented quickly by the Eastern
District judges and administrators. Facing numerous attacks and
lacking the will to correct racial disparities in other ways in the af-
termath of Ovalle, the Eastern District judges switched to a
"neutral" system that did not utilize race-conscience balancing. 53
Yet a very simple addition to the balancing system had already
45. Id.





51. Id. at 1109.
52. The Eastern District faced numerous challenges to the balancing system on direct
appeal and habeas corpus review by criminal defendants and prisoners who had been in-
dicted by grand juries or convicted by petit juries under the now-unconstitutional system.
See, e.g., United States v. Spearman, 186 F.3d 743 (6th Cir. 1999) (suggesting that jury selec-
tion post-Ovalle will leave African Americans underrepresented); Spearman v. United States,
No. 96-1887, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 29585 (6th Cir. Nov. 17, 1998) ("[Ovalle] does not ap-
pear to address claims of defendants who would complain about the low number of African
Americans in ajury pool."); United States v. Brown, 128 F. Supp. 2d 1034 (E.D. Mich. 2000);
United States v. Goode, 110 F. Supp. 2d 580 (E.D. Mich. 2000).
53. Interview with Avern Cohn, SeniorJudge, U.S. Dist. Ct. for the E. Dist. of Mich., in
Detroit, Mich. (Sept. 26, 2003) [hereinafter Cohn Interview].
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taken place. This addition was not at issue in Ovalle, but might have
led to a different constitutional analysis by the Sixth Circuit. Soon
after beginning the "balancing" procedures, the Eastern District
adjusted the system so that, rather than remove names from the
jury rolls during the balancing process, the Eastern District re-
turned the names to the qualified juror wheel for future
consideration; this created the modified Eastern District plan.54
What happened to the people who were subtracted from the quali-
fied wheel, and the impact of the destination of these names within
the Eastern District's system, remains somewhat in doubt. Judge
Cohn, in an article and in an interview, insisted that Ovalle only
struck down ajury selection system that eliminated stricken names
from service all together.5 Consequently, this leaves open the pos-
sibility that if names are returned to the jury pool or qualified jury
wheel, or reserved for future service should non-African Americans
be underrepresented in a future qualified jury wheel, the plan
would be constitutional.
Applying Ovalle, it is unclear whether the Sixth Circuit would
have considered this modified Eastern District plan, which merely
postponed jury service for a small number of non-African Ameri-
can members of the qualified jury wheel, to be a constitutional
violation as well. The Ovalle court emphasized that the elimination
of individuals from service was a major factor in finding the plan
unconstitutional, noting that "the one-in-five white or other jurors
eliminated from this qualified jury wheel did not have the same op-
portunity to serve as did the African-American members of the
wheel who were protected from elimination." 6 Similarly, elimina-
tion from service, not postponement, was what occurred for the
defendants' jury in Ovalle.57 With this modification, subtraction no
longer determines whether a non-minority individual will serve on a
jury, it only determines when a non-minority individual can serve.
This distinction might have saved the modified Eastern District
plan. However, if postponement occurs, meaning individuals'
names are returned to the qualified jury wheel, near the end of the
life of the master jury wheel, individuals would be prevented from
serving on ajury because of their race once the court creates a new
master jury wheel and the old master jury wheel and qualified jury
54. According to judge Cohn, the Eastern District always intended for names to be re-
turned to the qualified jury pool rather than eliminated, and the Eastern District corrected
the problem as soon as this discrepancy was discovered. Id.
55. Cohn & Sherwood, supra note 32, at 328; Cohn Interview, supra note 53.
56. United States v. Ovalle, 136 F.3d 1092, 1106 (6th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added).
57. Id. at 1100.
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wheel are eliminated. The modified Eastern District plan may have
little discernable impact on a juror's chance of serving early in the
life of a jury wheel, when addresses are fresh and the pool will be
used for many years, but it might have considerable impact near
the end of a jury wheel's life when more people have moved and
the court is preparing to draw an entirely new jury wheel from the
jury pool.
Whether these differences would substantially alter the Sixth
Circuit's analysis is unclear. Because the Eastern District chose not
to continue this plan, as it could have, we do not know the answer.
We do know that the problems the balancing system was designed
to correct have reappeared in the Eastern District. Early indica-
tions, after Ovalle was decided, "suggest that judges are trying
criminal cases largely with African-American defendants, prose-
cuted in front of mostly white judges, by mostly white prosecutors
and defense counsel, and with decisions made by almost all-white
juries. This is not fairness in the criminal justice system., 5
C. The Status Quo in the Eastern District
Striking down Ovalle was easy to do because no definitive data
existed to demonstrate whether an improved or adequate demo-
graphic balance could be achieved absent the balancing plan.
Indeed, the Sixth Circuit's decision that the balancing plan was not
narrowly tailored relied in large part on its belief that there were
likely to be alternative, race-neutral methods of increasing racial• 59
representativeness. It had been many years since the Eastern Dis-
trict operated a jury selection system without some compensation
for and recognition of demographic realities in the judicial district.
Today, more than six years later, the results of a "race neutral" plan
can be more fairly compared with what was struck down in Ovalle.
in October, 2000, the Eastern District placed 130,000 names of
individuals from the voter registration, personal identification
card, and driver's license files supplied by the Michigan Secretary
of State into the master jury wheel.60 The Eastern District mailed
forms to 60,400 individuals; 41,253 were returned and the remain-
58. Cohn & Sherwood, supra note 32, at 333.
59. Ovale, 136 F.3d at 1106.
60. The information included in this section was reported by the Eastern District of
Michigan to the Justice Department in Washington, D.C., on the JS-12 form, pursuant to
federal law. See supra note 6. The information from theJS-12 form reports a summary ofjury
wheel data and is recreated in the charts with some collapsing of data.
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ing 19,147 were not. The JS-12 form does not report why almost
one-third were not returned. For example, the JS-I 2 form includes
no notation as to how many were due to incorrect addresses, de-
spite the fact that the form includes a space for those deemed
undeliverable by the post office. Below in Table 1 and Table 2 is
the demographic breakdown of the 41,253 individuals from the
master jury wheel who returned their questionnaires.
TABLE 1
DEMOGRAPHIC BREAKDOWN OF THE MASTERJURY WHEEL61
Race Sex Total in % of
Male % Female % Unknown % Sample Sample
White 15,668 37.98 18,166 44.04 189 .46 34,023 82.47
Black 1,254 3.04 2022 4.90 58 .14 3,334 8.08
Native American 94 .23 82 .20 0 NA 176 .43
Asian 315 .76 341 .83 2 NA 658 1.60
Other 87 .21 99 .24 1 NA 187 .45
Unknown 1,373 3.33 1,452 3.52 50 .12 2,857 6.97
TOTAL 18,791 45.55 22,162 53.72 300 .73 41,253 100%
TABLE 2
ETHNIC BREAKDOWN OF THE MASTERJURY WHEEL
2
Ethnicity Sex Total in % of
Male % Female % Unknown % Sample Sample
Hispanic/Latino 179 .43 179 .43 NA NA 358 .87
Non-hispanic/ 12,109 29.35 13,992 33.92 192 .47 26,293 63.74
non-latino
Unknown 6503 15.76 7,991 19.37 108 .26 14,602 35.40
Total 18,791 45.55 22,162 53.72 300 .73 41,253 100
Table 2 indicates that more than 35% of the individuals com-
pleting the questionnaire either did not answer or were unsure
whether they were of Hispanic/Latino ethnicity (see "Unknown"
row). This number seems high and may partially explain why less
than 1% reported Hispanic/Latino ethnicity. More complete in-
formation is needed to analyze the impact of the Eastern District's
jury selection system on the Hispanic/Latino community.
From those 41,253 completed questionnaires, 30,683 individuals
composed the qualified jury wheel. While the form offers no
61. JS-12, supra note 6, at 1.
62. Id.
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explanation for this reduction, presumably citizens who were
disqualified or excused from service by statute, were unable to
perform jury service, or had changed residences, combined to
cause this reduction. The demographic data on the qualified jury
wheel follows in Table 3 and Table 4.
TABLE 3
DEMOGRAPHIC BREAKDOWN OF THE QUALIFIED JURY WHEEL"
Race Sex Total in % of
Male % Female % Unknown % Sample Sample
White 12,576 40.99 14,363 46.81 139 .45 27,078 88.25
Black 1,044 3.40 1,744 5.68 46 .15 2,834 9.24
Native American 73 .24 74 .24 NA NA 147 .48
Asian 205 .67 245 .80 2 .01 452 1.47
Other 50 .16 54 .18 NA NA 104 .34
Unknown 31 .10 36 .12 1 NA 68 .22
Total 13,979 45.56 16,516 53.83 188 .61 30,683 100
TABLE 4
ETHNIC BREAKDOWN OF THE QUALIFIED JURY WHEEL 64
Ethnicity Sex Total in % of
Male % Female % Unknown % Sample Sample
Hispanic/Latino 132 .43 120 .39 NA NA 252 .82
Non-hispanic/ 9,039 29.46 10,437 34.02 133 .43 19,609 63.91
non-latino
Unknown 4,808 15.67 5,959 19.42 55 .18 10,822 35.27
Total 13,979 45.56 16,516 53.83 188 .61 30,683 100
The JS-12 form concludes with a table comparing the demo-
graphic statistical data of the qualified jury wheel against the
general population in the Eastern District. Only people eighteen
years old and older in the general population were included in the
65demographic comparison since jurors must be eighteen years of
age or older.66 The comparison follows in Table 5.67
63. Id. at 2.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b) (1) (2000) (discussing statutory jury qualifications forjury ser-
vice).
67. The JS-12 form reports the ethnic and gender data of the qualified jury pool as
well, but does not report the comparable information for the general population. The JS-12
form has space for this information, but the Eastern District did not report the data on the
[VOL. 38:4
Fair Reprsentation on Juries
TABLE 5
DEMOGRAPHIC COMPARISON OF THE QUALIFIED JURY WHEEL
AGAINST THE POPULATION TOTAL.6 s
Race Wheel Sample # Wheel Sample % Population Total Population %
White 27,078 88.25 3,835,982 78.37
Black 2,834 9.24 821,990 16.79
Native American 147 .48 19,122 .39
Asian 452 1.47 99,144 2.03
Other 104 .34 45,525 .93
Unknown 68 .22 72,924 1.49
TOTAL 30,683 100 4,894,687 100
D. Analysis of the Eastern District's Data
All racial groups, except Whites and Native Americans, are un-
derrepresented in the qualified jury wheel as compared with the
group's representation in the total eligible population.69 African
Americans are the group with the largest real differential (7.55%)
between their percentage of the qualified jury wheel (9.24%) and
their percentage of the total eligible population (16.79%); this real
difference equates to a 55% decrease as compared with their per-
centage of the total eligible population. The Ovalle court
disapproved of the balancing system's emphasis on increasing rep-
resentation for African Americans to the exclusion of other
minority groups. However, this data suggests that the unbalanced,
"race-neutral" juror selection system adopted after Ovalle has re-
sulted in significant disparities, suggesting that perhaps the Eastern
District was correct pre-Ovalle to be concerned with ensuring an
increased level of representation by African Americans in the
qualified jury wheel, and that the Sixth Circuit did not appreciate
the need for the system struck down in Ovalle. The Eastern District
likely was particularly interested in avoiding a challenge to their
jury selection process due to the considerable under-
representation of African Americans in the qualified jury wheel
form. This makes it difficult, without more information, to determine whether Hispanics or
women are under- or over-represented in the jury system. While comparable information
could be acquired from census results, the author's unfamiliarity with the source used by the
Eastern District to report other data gives him pause. The author does not want to fill in the
blanks for the Eastern District, thus possibly leading to erroneous analyses and conclusions.
68. JS-12, supra note 6, at 2.
69. The comparative racial data reported on theJS-12 form did not include a compari-
son for Hispanics.
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that existed before the balancing system. The data presented above
suggests that this under-representation has reemerged since the
abandonment of the balancing system.
The Ovalle court was correct that the Eastern District could not
legally correct for the under-representation of one group by harm-
ing another underrepresented group, such as Hispanics. The
comparatively few people belonging to the "Asian," "Native
American," and "Other" racial categories make these groups' under-
representation on the qualified jury wheel less of a legal concern,
given the historical representation disparities necessary to mount a
challenge to the jury system,0 and the idea that a fair cross section of
the community does not require exact representativeness. 7' How-
ever, the Hispanic population is not accounted for in the qualified
jury wheel comparison with the total eligible population because of
the incomplete statistical data reported on the JS-12 form. 72 Until
the same comparison is done with the Hispanic population, it is un-
clear whether the Ovalle court was correct to suggest that the Eastern
District should have been as concerned with qualified jury wheel
under-representation in the Hispanic community as they were with
the African American community. Regardless, the Eastern District
should monitor the representativeness levels of each demographic
group, both racial- and gender-based, to ensure that their jury selec-
tion system is protected from constitutional challenge.
One could argue that a 7.55% real difference between a group's
total eligible population and the groups qualified jury wheel popu-
lation is not constitutionally consequential. In fact, the Greene court
surveyed related case law and found decisions holding that abso-
lute disparities of between 2% and 21.7% were insufficient to
establish a primafacie case of unconstitutional exclusion.3 In Greene
itself, a pre-Ovalle case, an 11.8% disparity did not give rise to an
inference of a Sixth Amendment violation.14 In a post-Ovalle case,
United States v. Brown, "the 7-to-8 percent disparities shown by De-
fendant here have never been held sufficient, standing alone, to
satisfy [one] element of a primafacie case.,
75
The test for examining fair cross section claims under the Sixth
Amendment and statutory requirements significantly overlaps that
70. See supra note 36.
71. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
72. See supra tbls.2 & 4.
73. United States v. Greene, 971 F. Supp. 1117, 1128 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
74. Id. at 1127-28.
75. United States v. Brown, 128 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1040 (2001).
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applied in Ovalle for deciding equal protection claims.76 There are
three elements:
(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a "distinctive"
group in the community; (2) that the representation of this
group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and
reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the
community; and (3) that underrepresentation is due to sys-
77
tematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.
Satisfying the first prong is quite easy, as racial groups are dis-
tinctive groups. The second prong is more difficult, and it is
unclear whether the 7.55% real difference amounts to an unfair or
unreasonable difference.
There are two arguments that the 7.55% real difference should
satisfy the second prong. First, this difference simply is
constitutionally significant. Each member of a twelve-person jury
makes up 8.33% of the jury, meaning that if African Americans are
underrepresented by 7.55%, on average one African American
person is replaced by another person, likely a white person, on
every jury.7s When it takes one person to hang a jury, this one
person seems enormously significant. Second, the 7.55% real
difference masks the proportional comparison of the harm. A
7.55% difference seems small. But the disparity seems more
significant when a 7.55% drop is described as a more than 55%
drop in African American representation on the qualified jury
wheel as compared with their percentage in the overall
population. 79 A hypothetical jurisdiction that is 50% female in the
total population, but 30% female in the qualified jury pool, has a
real difference of 20%, but only a 40% drop in female
representation on the qualified jury wheel. Similarly, a group with
68% of the overall population, but only 60% of the average venire,
is very different than a group with 8% of the overall population,
76. United States v. Ovalle, 136 F.3d 1092, 1104 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing Castaneda v.
Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977)).
77. Id. at 1098 n.7 (citing Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979)).
78. Whites are the most common and most overrepresented group in the jury wheel,
and thus are the most likely to replace an underrepresented group. The impact of over-
representation is more pronounced after peremptory challenges are used, as a white juror is
most likely to replace a stricken African American juror. See infra Part II.A.
79. Using the proportional decrease method makes the determination of which cogni-
zable groups to cover even more important, as the proportional decrease for groups which
total, for example, less than 1% of the population, could be enormous (i.e., if a group is
0.9% of the population, but only 0.1% the qualified jury wheel, the proportional decrease
would be 89%).
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but 0% of the average venire. Thus, an absolute percentage
comparison is just wrong as the only measure of whether the
group's representation is "fair and reasonable." That said, the
author advances no rule on what the cut off should be for deciding
whether the real or proportional percent disparity should satisfy
the Duren test, except to say that the 7.55% real difference for
African Americans should satisfy the second prong of the analysis
in the Eastern District.
The third prong, attributing the under-representation discrep-
ancy to the system, is also difficult to prove, especially since
allegedly random processes leading to a disparate result is insuffi-
cient to make this showing.0 While a complete analysis of the third
prong of the Duren test is beyond the scope of this Note, the courts
must decide at what point "random" and "neutral" procedures are
proven to be a function of the system based upon historical trends,
which create incontrovertible disparities in a distinctive group's
representation in the jury system. In this way, the real or propor-
tional percent disparity discussed under the second prong could
be, in unique circumstances, sufficient to satisfy the third prong of
this test.
E. Disclosure of the Information on the JS-12 Form
The JS-12 information is important to any challenge to a juror
selection system. Yet, the Eastern District does not make the above
JS-12 information regarding its jury selection plan available to the
public and it has the discretion to withhold the information from
criminal defendants seeking to challenge the jury selection plan
itself. No federal statute requires public disclosure, and the Free-
dom of Information Act does not apply to the judiciary.8 1 William
Burchill, the General Counsel to the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts, wrote in a letter to an Eastern District judge
that "[i]n the apparent absence of any other authority on this
point, I would conclude that the degree to whichJS-12 data should
be disseminated outside of the judiciary is left to the discretion of
80. See Browm, 128 F. Supp. 2d at 1041 ("[A] jury selection system does not systemati-
cally exclude a distinctive group where the system treats all groups equally but had a
disparate impact on one or more." (citing United States v. Footracer, 189 F.3d 1058, 1062
(9th Cir. 1999))). However, it should be noted that, post-Ovale, there was a conscious deci-
sion to reject a more representative system in favor of one that has produced less desirable
results.
81. 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1) (B) (2005) (exempting the "courts of the United States" from the
definition of "agency" for the purposes of the Freedom of Information Act).
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each district court."82 Mr. Burchill added that he expected that
courts keep theJS-12 data "quite close except perhaps when a pro-
ceeding is brought challenging jury selection under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1867."8' In the end, Mr. Burchill found no authority requiring
that the information be divulged. While no authority may exist for
regular disclosure, principles of transparency and good faith sug-
gest that theJS-12 data should be made publicly available.
The Eastern District does have a policy regarding release of jury
selection process information. Administrative Order No. 00-AO-
060 of the Eastern District of Michigan states:
In preparation for resolution of a motion challenging the
composition of a jury wheel or panel on the basis of race or
ethnicity or both, the Court urges judges of this bench to limit
the scope of any order permitting inspection and/or re-
cording of juror questionnaire information or other materials
as follows: juror number; race; Hispanic ethnicity. Accord-
ingly,
IT IS ORDERED that in the event that a party moves for the
provision of juror information beyond that contemplated in
this Administrative Order, such motion will be referred to the
Chief Judge; the Court assigns to the Chief Judge the respon-
sibility of reviewing and ruling upon the propriety of
providing any such additional juror information for good cause
shown by the movant, on a case-by-case basis.84
The Eastern District's process was recently utilized in the case of
United States v. Jones.85 In Jones, a criminal defendant requested the
Eastern District's jury selection records. The defendant claimed
that he met the "good cause shown" requirement of the Adminis-
trative Order because "it is necessary for him to have access to such
information in order to know whether the Court is failing to com-
ply with the provisions of the [Jury Selection and Service Act],
because otherwise no litigant would ever be able to ensure that the
82. Letter from William R. Burchill, Jr., Assoc. Dir. & Gen. Counsel, Admin. Office of
the U.S. Courts, to the Honorable Avern Cohn, Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of
Mich. 2 (December 18, 2003) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Re-
form).
83. Id. (referencing challenges based on the Jury Selection and Service Act).
84. E.D. Mich. Admin. Order No. 00-AO-060 (June 5, 2000) (emphasis added).
85. No. 01-80571-D-2 (E.D. Mich. May 14, 2004) (denying motion for access to jury se-
lection records).
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Court is in compliance., 86 The defendant cited Test v. U.S., which
held that "a litigant has essentially an unqualified right to inspect
jury lists.
87
Then-Chief Judge Lawrence Zatkoff rejected the defendant's
motion. Rather than an "unqualified right" to the jury selection
information, Judge Zatkoff ruled that the defendant was "entitled
to only such records or papers that he needs in order to challenge
the jury selection process." 88 Judge Zatkoff reconciled Test's "un-
qualified right to inspect jury lists" language with his ruling by
defining 'jury lists" more narrowly, as "there is no reason to think
that the Supreme Court stated that Defendant has an unqualified
right to all records or papers relating to the jury selection proc-
ess."89 After deciding that the defendant did not have an
"unqualified right" to the jury information, Judge Zatkoff had to
decide whether the defendant had shown "good cause" in his case
to receive the JS-12 and other information.9 Judge Zatkoff ruled
that the defendant could get adequate information to challenge
the jury selection system from the information already available to
him. Judge Zatkoff noted that the Eastern District's jury selection
plan was approved by the Judicial Council for the Sixth Circuit, was
designed to ensure that juries are selected at random from a fair
cross section of the community, and "cannot be said ... [to] sys-
tematically [exclude] any distinctive groups in the community
when selecting its jury wheels."9' Judge Zatkoff denied the defen-
dant's motion.
The process and circumstances under which courts must or
should divulge the contents of the JS-12 is beyond the scope of this
Note. However, it is logical that the availability of the JS-12 data to
litigants, especially criminal defendants, allows them to challenge
the jury selection system in a more effective and complete manner.
With the JS-12 data, more persuasive evidence of the system's ac-
tual impact, rather than procedural goals, would be before the
court. Challenges to the jury selection system which include the JS-
12 data could lead to more impartial juries that are racially bal-
anced by providing incentives for judicial districts to develop,
maintain, and improve their jury selection systems. Widespread
availability of the JS-12 information might help the Eastern District
strive to increase jury representativeness. Judge Zatkoff's approach
86. Id., slip op. at 16.
87. Test v. United States, 420 U.S. 28, 30 (1975).
88. Jones, No. 01-80571-D-2, slip op. at 16.
89. Id.
90. Id., slip op. at 17 (citing E.D. Mich. Admin. Order No. 00-AO-060 (June 5, 2000)).
91. Jones, No. 01-80571-D-2, slip op. at 19.
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to the Jones motion ignores the fact that many successful challenges
to jury selections system have come from challenging both the
process and the outcome of the jury selection system employed by the
judicial district.92 A data comparison between a demographic
group's actual population and qualified jury wheel population is
strong evidence of the merits of ajury system challenge. 9'
Finally, such a refusal to grant access to this information has sig-
nificant implications. The refusal to divulge the information in
Jones could create grounds for appeal, thus threatening the viability
of a criminal conviction. In addition, refusal by the Eastern District
to divulge the information could give the impression, rightly or
wrongly, that the data should be concealed from public view be-
cause the jury selection plan is biased or functionally unfair. These
problems can be avoided by releasing the JS-12 information and by
taking steps to increase jury representativeness, thus increasing the
likelihood that the jury's constitutional role in the judicial system
will be achieved.
II. REFORMS TO LESSEN RACIAL IMBALANCE ON JURIES
This Note advances three proposals for improving the jury selec-
tion system with the hope of increasing the representation of
currently underrepresented groups in the jury system: improving
the pool of potential jurors; updating the jury questionnaire to in-
crease the yield of minority respondents among those in the pool;
and, intentionally sacrificing a minimal degree of minority repre-
sentation on grand juries in favor of increased representation on
petit juries. Reforms for increasing jury representativeness posed
by other academics will be addressed first, as well as in the context
of the other reform proposals.
A. Other Models for Reform Impacting Representativeness
It is unfortunate that a 7%-8% difference between a demo-
graphic group's actual population and qualified jury wheel
population is acceptable. Even if one concurs with that assessment,
92. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
93. See supra note 36 (citing cases relying on comparisons between percentage of
population and juries to find constitutional violations).
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however, the 7%-8% drop in minority group representation
becomes even more problematic when litigators are allowed to ex-
ercise peremptory challenges. While litigators are not allowed to
strike a juror based solely on race or gender,94 there is no denying
that such challenges still occur,95 thus further diluting the presence
of minorities on juries. Thus, a group constituting almost 17% of
the total eligible jury population, and constituting about 9% of the
qualified jury wheel and venires, would likely constitute an even
lower percentage of the empanelled jury if even one person from
this group is peremptorily challenged. This is because, statistically,
the person selected to replace the stricken juror is not likely to be-
long to the minority group. The likely result is, on average,
approximately one person from that minority group will serve on a
standard twelve-person jury.
While Batson and its progeny have helped deter race-based chal-
lenges,9 such challenges cannot be eliminated absent additional
reforms because race-neutral reasons frequently can be proffered
to justify them. Reforms to the peremptory challenge system,
therefore, could increase minority group representation on juries.
The American Bar Association and others have published propos-
97
als to reform or eliminate the peremptory challenge system.
Ultimately, however, these reforms only increase the probability
that individuals on jury venires of certain demographic groups get
selected for jury service, and do nothing to increase the represen-
tation of these groups in the jury pool and qualified jury wheel.
Another idea for reform offered by jury reform scholars Nancy
King and G. Thomas Munsterman is known as "stratified selec-
tion."9 Touching on some features of the pre-Ovallejury selection
system in the Eastern District and the reforms offered below,
"stratified selection" works as follows:
By manipulating the number of citizens in each of several mul-
tiple smaller lists who are summoned, qualified, or sent
94. See supra Part I.A.
95. See, e.g., Shari Diamond et al., Realistic Responses to the Limitations of Batson v. Ken-
tucky, 7 CORNELLJ.L. & PUB. POL'Y 77 (1997); Anthony Page, Batson's Blindspot: Unconscious
Stereotyping and the Peremptory Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REV. 155, 156 (2005) (recounting a story
suggesting the Batson process is ineffective at preventing race-based challenges).
96. See generally Page, supra note 95 (providing supporting and contradictory evidence
on the deterrence of race-based challenges).
97. See Sol Schreiber, Principles for Juries and Jury Trials, in ABA AMERICAN JURY PRO-
JECT, at 929, 942-45 (SK042 ALI-ABA, 2005); Felice Banker, Note, Eliminating a Safe Haven
for Discrimination: Why New York Must Ban Peremptory Challenges from Jury Selection, 3 J.L. &
POL'Y 605 (1995); NancyJ. King & G. Thomas Munsterman, Stratified Juror Selection: Cross-
Section by Design, 79JUDICATuRE 273 (1996).
98. King & Munsterman, supra note 97, at 274.
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questionnaires, a court can ensure that each of several
populations is sampled proportionally, and can target for
oversampling those populations that continue to yield dispro-
portionately fewer veniremembers. Potential jurors can be
grouped according to whatever demographic characteristics
are available to jury administrators, including residence, eth-
nicity, or race.99
By essentially balancing the jury pool before questionnaires are
sent out, the court would be using available historic, geographic,
and/or demographic information to compensate for predicted
inadequacies in yield rates among identified groups. Unlike in
Ovalle, qualified jurors would not be removed from consideration
simply because of their race. However, proponents of "stratified
selection" concede that some applications of the system may not be
able to withstand statutory or constitutional challenge.'00
The aforementioned reforms certainly would increase jury rep-
resentativeness, but there are others that could help accomplish
this Sixth Amendment goal. These and other reforms are discussed
below.
B. The Jury Pool
Improving the pool from which potential jurors are drawn is the
least controversial recommendation. This reform has been dis-
cussed and attempted frequently,' though the extent of proposed
expansion varies. An improved pool would more accurately repre-
sent the community, would result in more diverse juries, and can
be done by adding people to the list, not subtracting names, which
the Ovalle court frowned upon.10 2 Currently, registered voters,
99. Id.
100. Id. at 276-78.
101. See United States v. Brown, 128 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1037 (2001) (discussing an Eastern
District report conducted by the National Center for State Courts' Center for Jury Studies that
suggested improvements to the sources of jury lists); HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 3, at 53-54;
David Kairys et al., Jury Representativeness: A Mandate for Multiple Source Lists, 65 CAL. L. REv. 776,
803-11 (1977); Cohn & Sherwood, supra note 32, at 327; Ellis & Diamond, supra note 2, at
1055-58; King & Munsterman, supra note 97, at 274; NancyJ. King, RacialJurymandering: Can-
cer or Cure? A Contemporary Review of Affirmative Action inJury Selection, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 707, 721
(1993); Council for Court Excellence, Juries for the Year 2000 and Beyond (2000), available at
http://www.courtexcellence.org/pdf/publicatons/juries-for-y2k-and-beyond_
20 0 .pdf (on
file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
102. United States v. Ovalle, 136 F.3d 1092, 1100 (6th Cir. 1998).
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licensed drivers, and Michigan identification card holders compose
the jury pool in the Eastern District.'03 The Supreme Court has de-
ferred to sources of jury lists "so long as the source reasonably
reflects a cross section of the population suitable in character and
intelligence for that civic duty."'04 Additional efforts should be un-
dertaken to supplement these sources if these lists have not proven
successful at creating a qualified jury wheel reflecting the popula-
tion. One option is for the federal government to give grants to
states to increase voter registration in underrepresented communi-
ties, by educating communities about the importance of jury
service, therefore increasing participation among historically un-
derrepresented minorities. This reform would serve the dual
purpose of increasing voter registration and providing the federal
court system with more potential jurors, and perhaps a more rep-
resentative group of individuals from which to draw a qualified
juror wheel.
A less costly alternative would be to expand the number of
source lists currently utilized by the Eastern District. Churches,
community organizations, and state public assistance rolls are all
potential sources of individuals that may not already be in the jury
pool. Those individuals on state public assistance could be particu-
larly useful as an additional source, °5 as these individuals may not
have a driver's license or state identification card, may not be regis-
tered to vote, and thus would not be in the current jury pool.
Incorporating names from additional sources brings the potential
for duplicity, a difficulty in determining who to add, and the pros-
pect that the data is unreliable, outdated, or unable to be
adequately updated. These problems are not fatal, however, as they
do not impose excessive costs or administrative burdens, and the
efforts advance a considerable government interest.
Every proponent of reforms aimed at achieving more represen-
tative juries laments society's inability to create the perfect
community list able to achieve fair cross sections of the community
in the jury box. Motor Votei, which encourages people to register
to vote when applying for or renewing a driver's license, was sup-
posed to cure this problem,'06 making it easier to become part of
the jury pool and eliminating the discrimination inherent in other
103. Juror Selection Plan, E.D. Mich. Admin. Order No. 00-AO-083, at 3 (Dec. 5, 2000).
104. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 474 (1953); see also Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S.
320, 330 (1970) (discussing the exclusion of African Americans from the sources used for
jury selection).
105. See Dennis Bilecki, Program improves minority group representation on federal juries, 77
JUDICATURE 221, 222 (1994); Kairys et al., supra note 101.
106. SeeCohn & Sherwood, supra note 32, at 330
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methods of juror recruitment. Whether the alternative method of
recruitment is fewer government lists, or the keyman system, which
consists of a small group of people who are "given discretion to
select qualified individuals" to be eligible and serve on ajury,107 jury
pool source selection can result in a less diverse jury pool. While
reducing opportunities for discrimination, discretion still is pre-
sent "in designating the original source lists or supplemental
sources lists or in designating the groups that will be ... exempt."
10 8
The best way to eliminate potentially harmful discretion is to greatly
expand the manner in which valid data can be added to the jury
pool. Random selection of jurors from a non-random, or inciden-
tally discriminatorily created, jury pool would create non-randomly
constituted juries. Therefore, something more than simple random
selection from the current jury pool is necessary to achieve repre-
sentative juries.
C. The Jury Questionnaire
Regardless of whether the Eastern District, or any other judicial
jurisdiction, attempts to address the disparity in racial composition
in its juries, maintaining, recording and reporting such data are
integral mechanisms that can guarantee progress or correct regres-
sion toward inequities in the jury selection system. The Eastern
District's Juror Questionnaire requests racial data from respon-
dents in Question 10.1°0 The Questionnaire explains the purpose of
Question 10 as "to avoid discrimination in juror selection and has
absolutely no bearing on qualifications for jury service."' 1 The ex-
planation for Question 10 ends by emphasizing that the data "can
fulfill the policy of the United States, which is to provide jurors
107. SARA SUN BEALE ET AL., GRAND JURY LAW AND PRACTICE § 3:5, at 3-25 (2d ed.
1996). See generally BEALE ET AL., supra, § 3:6, at 3-21 (providing an explanation of keyman
systems); Eric M. Albritton, Race-Conscious Grand Juror Selection: The Equal Protection Clause and
Strict Scrutiny, 31 AM. J. CRIM. L. 175, 202-10 (2003) (providing an in-depth analysis for the
Texas key man system, at issue in Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977), and its impact on
representativeness of grand juries).
108. BEALE ET AL., supra note 107, § 3:5, at 3-35 (citations omitted).
109. EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, JUROR QUALI-
FICATION QUESTIONNAIRE Question 10(a)-(b) [hereinafter QUESTIONNAIRE] (on file with
The University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). The Questionnaire used appears to be
a standard form utilized by other U.S. District Courts.
110. QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 109, Notes Regarding the Qualification Form, Ques-
tion 10-Race/Ethnicity. Other data, such as sex, occupation, and marital status, are
collected in Questions 11, 12, and 15.
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who are randomly selected from fair cross section of the commu-
nity." "'
The Questionnaire and accompanying notes are augmented by
the Eastern District with a less formal flyer entitled "Additional In-
structions for filling out the Jury Qualification Questionnaire.""'
The flyer provides additional advice and notices for the potential
jurors. The form requests that individuals complete and sign the
Questionnaire and draws particular attention to Questions 10 and
14.'1 The following announcement is printed in bold, underlined,
and in a larger font than the rest of the flyer: "Do not skip question
#10, you must answer PART A AND B OF THE QUESTION. SEE
BACK OF QUESTIONNAIRE FOR EXPLANATION." Eastern
District practice also includes returning the questionnaire to the
respondent to determine race if the question is not answered ini-
tially." 5
All of these measures to collect the demographic characteristics
of potential jurors are integral to improving the representativeness
of the jury pool. Without such data, tracking the progress of the
system would be impossible. Under Ovalle, the Sixth Circuit may
require that such information be tracked for other racial and non-
racial groups as well, if the group constitutes a "cognizable
group.
The Eastern District employs many positive steps to collect
demographic data, but does not use the Questionnaire as an op-
portunity for citizen education or to motivate citizens to participate
in the jury system. Perhaps the current Questionnaire and flyer are
insufficient to encourage an increased response rate among his-
torically under-represented groups. The Eastern District should
make a more vigorous appeal, particularly since demographic in-
formation about the individual can be determined before the
111. Id.
112. EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, AUDITIONAL
INSTRUCTIONS FOR FILLING OUT THE JURY QUALIFICATION QUESTIONNAIRE [hereinafter
ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS] (on file with The University of Michigan Journal of Law Re-
form).
113. Id. Question 14 addresses grounds for requesting an excuse. QUESTIONNAIRE, supra
note 109.
114. ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 112.
115. See United States v. Ovalle, 136 F.3d 1092, 1096 (6th Cir. 1998).
116. Id. at 1095. An Arizona commission on jury reform reported that some states de-
fine a "numerically significant... minority group" as one that registers more than 3% of the
local population. B. Michael Dann & George Logan III, Jury reform: the Arizona experience, 79
JUDICATURE 280, 284 (1996). Although the JS-12 appears incomplete regarding Hispan-
ics/Latinos in the Eastern District population, Hispanics/Latinos may constitute a
cognizable group about which the Eastern District should be concerned.
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questionnaire is mailed, "7 thus enabling the court to specifically
target underrepresented groups. The envelope's exterior could
include an identification notice, including an appeal directed to-
ward racial minorities. The Eastern District already includes an
additional flyer providing guidance, which could perhaps provide
information explaining that minority groups have been underrep-
resented in the past and that their participation is important to
reduce or prevent underrepresentation in the future. If the race of
the individual is known ahead of time, more can and should be
done to target the questionnaire to make it more likely that the
citizen will respond.
As with jury pool expansion, jury questionnaire reform can be
done with increased attention and minimal cost. Each step in the
process, from jury pool development to peremptory challenges,
plays a role in any resulting disparities between the demographic
composition of the general population and venire. The Question-
naire should be examined and retained in its current form for
reasons beyond convenience and an appearance of neutrality. Ide-
ally, the Questionnaire should advance the constitutional and
societal goals of jury representativeness, rather than just serve a
functional role in the overall jury selection process.
D. The Grand Jury
The case for juries made up of a fair cross section of the
community, resulting in fair and balanced representation on juries,
has been amply stated. The Supreme Court long ago recognized
these principles and the government's obligation to achieve them.
But every case discussed thus far only speaks of the constitutional
requirements in trial, or petit, juries. In Castaneda v. Partidal" and
Vasquez v. Hillery,1 9 the Supreme Court extended to criminal
defendants the same fair cross section protections given petit juries
to grand juries. Castaneda addressed a situation in which the
Hispanic population constituted 79.1% of the population, but,
utilizing the key man system, only represented 39% of the persons
summoned for grand jury duty in a Texas border town over an
117. States collect basic demographic data for identification purposes that should be
accessible to the courts. The data collected could vary on a state by state basis.
118. 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
119. 474 U.S. 254 (1986).
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eleven year period.12° In Vasquez, the Court deemed an entire
California county's grand juror selection system unconstitutional
after a more than sixty year history with no African American
serving on a grandjury.
12
1
Despite the Supreme Court having extended similar protections
to and demanded comparable expectations of grand juries,, there
are many structural and functional differences between petit and
grand juries. These differences lead to a different government in-
terest in ensuring representative composition on each respective
jury type. These differences should warrant applying a different
constitutional analysis regarding the interests served by requiring
fair cross sections of the community on grand juries.1 2  Such differ-
ences also could justify sacrificing some racial balance on grand
juries in favor of increased racial balance on petit juries.
What are these differences? Federal grand jurors are drawn from
the same group of people as petitjurors.12 However, grand juries are
composed of twenty-three people, 24 and a simple majority of twelve
is needed to present an indictment, 125 whereas petit juries generally
require unanimity, or near-unanimity, of their twelve members to
convict. 16 Grand juries generally accept the prosecutor's recom-
mendation 12 7 while petit juries are more unpredictable.
2 8
Grand juries are also inquisitorial in nature and may be con-
vened without the suspect or arrested party's knowledge,
permission or ability to respond to an accusation. 29 Petitjuries are
part of the adversarial criminal system, where the accused has the
constitutional right "to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him.' 3°
More relevant to grand jury fairness and functioning is that, unlike
in trials, federal courts "have refused to require the grand jury to
120. Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 495.
121. Vasquez, 474 U.S. at 259.
122. Grand juries are not constitutdon-aly required in state prosecutions, but are re-
quired in federal courts pursuant to the 5th Amendment, which reads in part: "No person
shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment
or indictment of a GrandJury...." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
123. See MARVIN E. FRANKEL & GARY P. NAFTALIS, THE GRAND JURY 44 (1977).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 48.
126. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356
(1972) (holding that unanimity is not required under the Due Process Clause in every case).
127. See FRANKEL & NAFTALIS, supra note 123, at 50.
128. The prospect ofjury nullification and the motivation for parties to criminal actions
to enter into plea agreements is evidence of this uncertainty.
129. See BEALE ET AL., supra note 107, § 1.6, at 1-29.
130. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
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apply the technical rules of evidence . . . ."' For example, hearsay
is admissible, as is evidence obtained through illegal searches and
seizures. Confessions obtained in violation of the Fifth Amend-
ment's self-incrimination clause are also admissible. Exculpatory
evidence need not be offered by the prosecutor. 132 In theory, a
grand jury ensures the review of charges by independent individu-




But because suspects cannot respond to accusations, potentially
inadmissible evidence can be offered to grand juries, prosecutors
can disregard exculpatory evidence, and only a simple majority of
grand jurors must support the indictment, suggest that grand ju-
ries are not the same in practice as in theory. Grand juries seem to
be a rubber stamp more than an independent safeguard.
In any event, proportional representation of minority groups on
grand juries does not have the same impact as it has on petitjuries.
While some suggest changing the grand jury system, 13 4 this Note
argues that until such reform occurs, the government's interest in
having a fair cross section of the community on the grand jury, and
the goal of racial representativeness on the grand jury, may not be
as acute and important to the functioning of the criminal justice
system as racial representativeness is on petit juries. With the inter-
est in a fair cross section and proportional representation on grand
juries reduced, this Note proposes sacrificing, minimally, some of
the racial balance on grand juries in favor of increased representa-
tion of underrepresented groups on petitjuries.
This process could happen in many different ways; this Note will
outline the general process. To review, a qualified juror wheel is
composed of individuals on the master jury wheel who respond to
the jury questionnaire and are qualified to serve. Respondents are
required to indicate their race on the questionnaire form, so a
comparison between racial composition of the resulting qualified
jury wheel and the general population eligible for jury service can
be performed. The court should take special note of racial groups
that comprise a numerically significant minority group which are
sometimes identified as those groups that register more than three
percent of the local population.3 5 The Eastern District could adopt
131. BEALE ET AL., supra note 107, § 1.6, at 1-29.
132. See id., § 1.9, at 1-35 to 1-36.
133. Id., § 1.7, at 1-31.
134. See id., § 1.7, at 1-35 to 1-36; see also Andrew Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do Not (and
Cannot) Protect the Accused, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 260 (1995) (providing viewpoint on grand
jury effectiveness and potential reform).
135. Dann & Logan, supra note 116, at 284.
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its own definition based on the demographic composition of the
region and other political considerations.
If there is no disparity, or a statistically insignificant disparity, be-
tween the eligible general population and the members of the
qualified jury wheel, there is no problem to correct. However, as is
more likely, once the court knows the disparity between the eligi-
ble general population and the members of the qualified jury
wheel for a particular cognizable group, it can compensate for the
disparity in the creation of petit jury venires and grand juries by
consciously selecting more individuals from underrepresented
groups..6 for petit jury service. The likely result is that white indi-
viduals would compose a greater percentage of grand juries than
they currently do, and then would be more likely to be assigned
grand jury duty. Though potentially a cause for concern, this is not
a fatal problem.
Currently, grand juries are empanelled infrequently and serve
for long periods of time.3 v In order for this reform to have any sig-
nificant impact, therefore, grand jurors would need to serve
shorter terms, permitting more individuals to be selected for grand
jury duty, resulting in a greater number of individuals being se-
lected from the qualified juror wheel. Each federal judicial district
empanels grand juries at a different rate depending on their
needs. The shorter the term of service, the greater the opportunity
there is for the court to consider potential jurors and attain a more
representative petit jury venire by sacrificing some degree of repre-
sentation on grand juries. For example, if a grand jury containing
twenty-three individuals meets periodically for six months, decreas-
ing the amount of time a grand jury sits to one month would
increase the needed number of grand jurors six-fold. This would
require additional jurors, thus an additional, and monthly, oppor-
tunity to achieve greater representation on petit juries by
sacrificing some degree of representation on grand juries.
Racial balance on grand juries should still be a concern, and
grandjuries certainly should not become racially homogeneous. But
given the differences in functioning and predictability of the result
for grand juries, a petit jury venire that is more racially representa-
tive of the surrounding community has a much better chance of
having the impact juries are expected to have on the trial system:
community confidence in the legal system and result, 3 appearance
136. Each judicial jurisdiction could choose how to define its own underrepresented
groups; for example, the Eastern District does not track all racial groups. See supra note 67.
137. See Cohn Interview, supra note 53. This practice may vary from district to district.
138. Ellis & Diamond, supra note 2, at 1038; Vikoren, supra note 14, at 621.
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of impartiality,' 9 and the differing backgrounds that contribute to
a more sophisticated consideration of the evidence and assess-
ments of credibility.
140
Unlike the previous Eastern District plan struck down in
Ovalle,' this system would not prevent or even delay jury service
on account of race. Instead, it would solely, and only potentially,
impact the type ofjury on which a person will serve. The impact on
grand jury functioning should also be minimal, as grand juries
generally do not reject a prosecutor's attempt to indict. 42 And, ac-
cording to Eastern District of Michigan District Judge Avern Cohn,
the extent of a challenge in a criminal case to the petit jury and/or
grand jury is usually directly proportional to the resources of the
defendant,14 3 indicating that grand jury challenges are infrequent
and acts of desperation by defendants, not a regular issue raised in
a typical criminal judicial proceeding.4 4 Therefore, the costs of this
grand jury/petit jury reform are outweighed by the benefit of in-
creased representation on petit juries.
III. CRITICISMS AND BENEFITS OF REFORM
Opposition to improvements in the jury pool or juror question-
naire may exist, but the opposition is more likely to have a basis in
politics or policy, rather than a basis in legal reason. The grand
jury/petit jury reform raises constitutional concerns and criticisms,
however, and therefore these concerns will be the exclusive subject
of this section.
A race-conscious jury selection system that increases
representation of some groups on petit juries and simultaneously
decreases representation of that same group on grand juries likely
would be attacked on Equal Protection grounds, 1 5 or because it
139. Ellis & Diamond, supra note 2, at 1034; Forde-Mazrui, supra note 14, at 361.
140. Ellis & Diamond, supra note 2, at 1038; see also sources cited supra note 14.
141. United States v. Ovalle, 136 F.3d 1092 (6th Cir. 1998).
142. See FRANKEL & NAFrALIS, supra note 123, at 50.
143. Cohn Interview, supra note 53.
144. One could argue that challenges to grand juries could increase should this reform
be implemented. The potential increase in grand jury challenges may occur only to the
extent that a grand jury empanelled under this plan fails to survive constitutional muster. If
constitutional, challenges to this plan should be as infrequent as they are to the current
plan. So while initial challenges could occur, the reform would not create a systemic change
in grand jury challenges. See infra Part III (discussing constitutionality of this system).
145. Federal use of this policy might violate the Fifth Amendment, while states apply-
ing this policy might violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
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violates constitutional and statutory fair cross section requirements.
As previously stated, there is a significant overlap between the
analyses under each of these claims. The three prong Duren test
discussed above and cited in Brown will provide the framework for
this analysis.
Recall that the first prong of the Duren test asks whether a "dis-
tinctive group" is being excluded from the jury pool. This prong is
difficult to satisfy in the grand jury/petit jury reform. No group is
being excluded. Instead, individuals of some groups are simply
more likely to receive grand jury duty rather than petit jury duty.
The second and third prongs are more easily satisfied. If the grand
jury/petit jury reform leads to too great a racial disparity on grand
juries, the second prong, that jury demographics reasonably relate
to the community, may be satisfied. Since there is an explicit sys-
temic cause for the disparity in the jury, the third prong,
specifically in the grand jury, that prong also may be satisfied.
However, because all groups and individuals are considered in the
jury pool, the first prong in establishing a challenge to the grand
jury/petit jury reform is not met.
A court could find that the proposed reform satisfies all prongs
of the Duren test because of the impact of the grand jury-petit jury
distinction directing over-represented groups to grand juries.
Thus, if a challenger establishes a prima facie case that a jury was
selected in violation of a defendant's fair cross section and Equal
Protection rights, 146 something that is more easily done after
Ovalle,147 and more possible given the likely decrease in minority
representation on grand juries, the government then must show
that the jury plan (a) meets a compelling government interest and
(b) is narrowly tailored to meet that interest.1
48
The Ovalle court found a compelling government interest in
having a fair cross section of the community represented on grand
and petit juries, and to assure that all citizens would have the op-
portunity to be considered for service on those juries. 49 The Sixth
146. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 495 (1977) (explaining that a defendant
must show that the group excluded is a "recognizable, distinct class, singled out for different
treatment under the laws," that the degree of under-representation has occurred over a
significant period of time, and that the selection process is not racially neutral or susceptible
to abuse) (citation omitted).
147. United States v. Ovalle, 136 F.3d 1092, 1104-05 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding that direct
exclusion from juries based on race is sufficient to establish a prima facie case for an Equal
Protection violation).
148. This Note's Equal Protection analysis presumes that strict scrutiny would apply to
race-conscious jury selection. The lower courts have not been consistent in the applicable
level of scrutiny in these types of cases. SeeAlbritton, supra note 107, at 194-95.
149. Ovalle, 136 F.3d at 1105.
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Amendment goal of an impartial jury was integral to the Sixth Cir-
cuit's conclusion. These are also the same goals that the grand
jury/petit jury reform seeks to achieve because the grand
jury/petit jury reform seeks increased representativeness on petit
juries due to their higher degree of practical importance to the
judicial system. This proposal implicates the government interest
in making efficient and effective use of the jury system as a check
on state power. It does so by ensuring demographic diversity on the
type of jury with a demonstrable ability to make a greater difference
in the criminal justice system. Moreover, diversity itself is a compel-
ling government interest in admitting students to state-sponsored
educational institutions.15 Thus, because diversity is integral to the
decisional effectiveness of juries,15 ' racial diversity injury service may
serve a compelling interest for jury selection plans just as it does in
the higher education context. Unlike some race-conscious plans,
the interest served is not remedial in nature. The benefits being
conferred upon an individual or group on the basis of race are
only those to which they are entitled: the Sixth Amendment's
guarantee that the defendant will be tried by a fair cross section of
the community and jury of their peers, and the post-Batson right of
citizens to participate in the jury system. The grand jury/petit jury
reform preserves the equal right and opportunity to perform the
civic function of jury service. Implementing this reform serves a
compelling state interest.
Turning to the requirement that any race-conscious jury plan be
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest, Ovalle found
that the Eastern District's "balancing" plan was not narrowly tai-
lored. Non-African Americans did not have the same opportunities
to serve, as they were being eliminated from the qualified jury
wheel; and no similar procedure was in place for other cognizable
minority groups to be represented on the qualified jury wheel.152
The Sixth Circuit also stated that "broadening membership in the
jury pool could have been utilized" as a method of achieving com-
parable results.1 5 3 While these are not the only possible criticisms of
a race-conscious jury plan, they will be addressed first.
Rather than eliminate or postpone the selection ofjurors, as was
done under the Eastern District's balancing plan, the grand
jury/petit jury plan simply predetermines with a greater likelihood
the type of jury to which each member of a demographic group
150. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
151. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
152. Oval, 136 E3d at 1106.
153. Id.
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will be assigned. No one is prevented or delayed from serving on a
jury. The character of the district in which someone can serve also
remains unchanged. The plan advances the strong state interest in
having greater representativeness on petit juries compared with
grand juries.
Strauder v. West Virginia154 and Duren v. Missouri'5  dealt with stat-
utes excluding56 groups from jury service based on race and
gender. Castaneda v. Partida15 7 and United States v. Ovalle15 make
clear that conscious consideration of race or gender alone, not just
racial discrimination, may be prohibited under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. It is important to distinguish the principles of racial
discrimination and racial consciousness in jury selection systems.
The former occurs when members of a certain group are pre-
vented from serving on account of some prohibited classification
(in this case race); the latter, under the grand jury/petit jury plan,
happens when race is considered to determine the type of jury on
which someone serves. There is no evidence to suggest that one
type of jury has a greater value than another jury when reviewing a
jury selection plan for constitutional violations, though the petit
jury indeed has a greater practical influence and effect than the
grand jury. Therefore, no right or benefit of citizenship is withheld
on account of race, which would more strongly implicate Equal
Protection concerns. The Ovalle court's concern of the direct im-
pact of race consciousness on particular racial groups therefore is
not material to the grand jury/petit jury reform.
The next criticism raised by the Ovalle court was that no similar
procedure existed for other minority groups. 59 Under the grand
jury/petit jury reform, each district can identify the cognizable
groups present in the population. The constitutional implications
raised by identifying cognizable groups should be easy to satisfy, as
the Supreme Court has already identified such cognizable groups
relevant to other government action. The added burden of consid-
ering each cognizable group as part of the jury selection plan, rather
than only African Americans as the Eastern District did in their bal-
ancing plan, may make any plan more difficult, but not impossible,
to implement. Protection of all potentially underrepresented
groups is required by the narrowly tailored prong of the Equal Pro-
tection test.
154. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
155. 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
156. The exclusion was either absolute or systematic.
157. 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
158. 136 F.3d 1092, 1092 (6th Cir. 1998).
159. Id. at 1106.
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The final basis for the Sixth Circuit's finding against the Eastern
District in Ovalle was that other mechanisms to accomplish the goal
could be employed. For example, "broadening membership in the
jury pool," 16° would be a more narrowly tailored method of achiev-
ing the same result. Indeed, other means of enhancing jury
representation should be and have been pursued.'6 ' But those
means create questions of effectiveness and legality. As noted
above, the Eastern District, other districts, and numerous scholars
have investigated ways of creating juries that represent a fair cross
section of the community, including paying attention to the jury
pool, without complete success. Additionally, intentionally adding
a race-conscious list, such as one from a church with a dominant
racial demographic, as a means of "broadening membership in the
jury pool," could raise the same equal protection concerns present
in Ovalle or the grand jury/petit jury plan. Faith in a larger jury
pool and additional lists, given the extent to which this remedy has
been attempted, seems an excusatory rather than an effective solu-
tion. Finally, the Eastern District now has experience in employing
the other mechanisms and more "race-neutral" procedures Ovalle
called for and has not adequately remedied the problem, despite
the fact that some judges consider a 7%-8% disparity, or more
than 50% drop, between a demographic group's actual population
and qualified jury pool population to be constitutional. How long
must judicial districts, or, more importantly, the community, have
to wait before alternative means of achieving representation can be
employed and be deemed narrowly tailored?
The grand jury/petit jury plan also may be criticized because it
could lead to insufficient representation of demographic groups on
grand juries. Since representation on the grand jury under this plan
would be sacrificed to a degree, the grand jury's representativeness
may depart further from the goal of representing a fair cross section
of the community, as is required. 63 Yet this criticism ignores the fact
that under the status quo a fair cross section is not achieved. A con-
stitutional problem only exists if the disparity created by the new
plan between total eligible population and grand jury composition
of a demographic group reaches alarming levels over time. This
Note does not advocate decreasing minority representation on
160. Id.
161. See supra Part II.A; see also United States v. Brown, 128 F. Supp. 2d 1034 (E.D. Mich.
2000) (discussing the Eastern District's commissioned study); Mossing, supra note 29.
162. See supra Part I.C.
163. See supra Part I.D; see also Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986); Castaneda v. Par-
tida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
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grand juries to such low levels. Moreover, unlike other cases, 164 the
reason for the failure to empanel a fair cross section of the com-
munity on some grand juries will not be because distinct groups
are statutorily or systematically discouraged from serving as jurors,
or due to a desire to keep some individuals out of the process.
Rather, the failure would be that a greater government interest can
be achieved by placing an emphasis on assigning traditionally un-
derrepresented groups to petit juries rather than grand juries. The
flexibility created by having two types of juries on which to place
citizens, and the different role each plays, should be a factor in
analyzing this constitutional concern.
165The constitutional concerns involving electoral redistricting
may be levied against the grand jury/petit jury plan. In some state
electoral redistricting efforts, district lines are drawn to include a
certain percentage of a minority group to increase the likelihood
that that district will elect someone from a particular group. Simi-
larities, it can be argued, exist between this system and the grand
jury/petit jury plan in that race is used as a predictor of experi-
ence, opinion and judgment.16  Tactics similar to those used in
electoral redistricting could also be used in jury reform, such as
altering the geographic areas from which citizens are eligible for
jury service to achieve increases in minority jury representation in
that judicial district. Neither concern is relevant to the grand
jury/petit jury plan. No jurisdictional lines are altered in this plan.
More importantly, increased representation on petit juries is in-
tended to result in representation commensurate with the
demographic group's population, not to attain majority status for a
particular group with the hope of determining the outcome in any
particular case. These differences distinguish the equal protection
concerns raised by the electoral redistricting cases from the grand
jury/petitjury reform.
Finally, some practical issues in implementing the grand
jury/petit jury reform raise important policy concerns. These con-
cerns should be taken into account when implementing this
reform. First, there is no guarantee that the resulting representa-
tive jury will hear a criminal case, and instead the jury may hear a
164. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522
(1975); see also supra Part I.A.
165. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
166. See Forde-Mazrui, supra note 14 (providing insight on how the Supreme Court's
Equal Protection analysis regarding electoral redistricting might impact efforts to increase
minority representation on juries); King, supra note 101, at 729-60 (explaining how the
Supreme Court's Equal Protection analysis regarding electoral redistricting might impact
efforts to increase minority representation on juries).
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civil matter. Many of the government interests discussed above are
more applicable in criminal cases than civil cases. Ensuring greater
representativeness on civil juries may not be as important to some
judicial districts.167 Perhaps this reform could be implemented to
only impact criminal cases. Second, grand juries often need to sit
for periods longer than one month during more complex or
longer investigations. Perhaps one grand jury in the judicial district
should only hear longer cases, while the other(s) serve for shorter
periods of time to allow the reform to have a greater impact.
Third, grand jurors hear numerous cases, meaning that sacrificing
diversity on one grand jury could impact hundreds of cases. This is
particularly true if a minority grand juror ends up on a civil petit
jury. However, this concern need only be weighed against the func-
tional realities of the grand jury discussed in Part II.D to determine
whether this potential cost is worth the benefit.
CONCLUSION
Race and gender are still significant conscious and subconscious
factors in the way Americans live their lives, despite the efforts of
many in society. As long as racial groups are significantly underrep-
resented on juries, the interests of defendants and communities in
having cases heard and decided by diverse and representative ju-
ries is not realized. The Eastern District of Michigan should not
abandon its history of taking proactive, constitutional (although
not constitutionally required), measures to empanel juries repre-
senting a fair cross section of the community they represent. The
Eastern District should not delay in reforming its jury selection sys-
tem to eliminate the disparities that currently exist in some
demographic groups.
167. Richard 0. Lempert, Uncovering "Non-Discernible" Differences: Empirical Research and
the Jury-Size Case, 73 MICH. L. REv. 643 (1975) (arguing thatjury representativeness matters in
civil cases).
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